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This study reviews the existing literature on the U.S. peer review system and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection system to assess our knowledge of audit regulation. The traditional self-regulatory system of the accounting profession came to an end, in 2002, when the PCAOB was established to oversee the audit firms of publicly traded companies. This paper contributes to the controversial debate about self-regulation versus independent regulation by analyzing, categorizing, and comparing the research findings on the peer review system and the PCAOB system along three dimensions: the validity of peer reviews and PCAOB inspections, the recognition of reviews and inspections by decision-makers (e.g., investors, bankers, committees), and the effect of reviews and inspections on audit quality. Synthesizing the research on the regulatory regimes suggests that the notion of external quality control, both through peer reviews and government inspections, is positively linked with an improvement of audit quality. At the same time, the analysis indicates that external users do not seem to recognise peer review and PCAOB reports as very useful instruments for decision-making, which is in line with an identified rather skeptical perception of the audit profession on reviews and inspections. Overall, this study reveals that although the academic literature on peer review and PCAOB inspection is extensive it has not produced definitive conclusions concerning various aspects of audit regulation. This paper shows how this blurred picture is due to conflicting research findings, the dominance of the quantitative research paradigm, and unchallenged assumptions within the literature, and concludes by proposing research opportunities for the future.

The research question we address in this paper is whether the effort invested by the internal auditor in the firm is associated with better firm performance. Our measure of effort is the number of audit hours invested in the firm, and firm performance is measured by the likelihood of a restatement of the firm's financial results. This study is the first to analyze this question, an endeavor made possible by a difference in disclosure requirements regarding internal audit effort between the US and Israel. Our analysis is conducted using hand-collected data on firms traded on Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) during the period 2010–2014. We expect that auditor effort is negatively associated with the likelihood of restatements of the firm's financial results. Indeed, our findings support this hypothesis. We also consider the association between restatements and two audit committee characteristics – the degree of independence and the degree of expertise of its members. However, these associations are not upheld by the data.

Examines whether two key audit committee characteristics combined, activity and independence, reduce likely fraud or aggressive financial statement actions. Utilizes evidence on potential of Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) recommendations regarding composition of audit committees, and further involves a sample of 156 firms — 78 subject to SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and 78 similar sized non‐sanctioned firms. Closes by stating future research may be required regarding young and mature firms ‐ that could affect monitoring.

In recent years, numerous studies have investigated whether individual executives and their characteristics relate to financial reporting choices. In this article, we review archival, experimental and survey research on the influence of individual executives on corporate financial reporting and use upper echelons theory as our organizing framework. Our review of 60 studies shows that research consistently finds that top management executives exert significant influence on financial reporting decisions, particularly on disclosure quality. Empirical research has developed promising approaches to investigate executives' psychological attributes and character traits. The results of studies examining the influence of demographic characteristics of individual executives are, however, sometimes contradictory and ambiguous. Nevertheless, the overall empirical results we review are supportive of upper echelons predictions. Additional research in this field is needed to clarify the influence of unexamined upper echelon characteristics, important moderator variables, and adverse selection effects. We also suggest that future research more closely investigates the magnitudes of managerial influence and adopts a more holistic perspective on financial reporting outcomes.

This study aims to examine the Taiwan setting, where audit partners’ names are presented in the audit report and where audit committee formation is voluntary in the initial stage of audit committee reform. This paper investigates the effects of the formation of voluntary audit committees on the selection of individual audit partners, and, in turn, the audit quality. This contrasts with previous studies investigating the relationship between audit committees and auditor selection at the audit firm level.

This paper samples all of Taiwan’s publicly listed firms for the period 2007–2012 and uses Heckman’s (1979) two-stage estimation model to achieve our objectives.

Using different characteristics of individual engagement partners as proxies for a higher quality auditor, the main empirical results show that voluntary audit committee formation is positively related to an industry specialist lead partner and a lead partner that has a larger number of clients. In addition, this paper also finds that voluntary audit committee formation has a positive impact on audit quality (proxied by discretionary accruals). The results suggest that the voluntary formation of an audit committee contributes positively to both auditor selection and audit quality. Furthermore, an additional test shows that the main empirical results are robust to a validity threat that firms that have good corporate governance prior to the formation of voluntary audit committees tend to select high-quality audit partners.

The paper contributes to the audit committee literature in the following ways: this paper takes advantage of Taiwan’s unique setting, where forming an audit committee is not compulsory in the initial stage of audit committee reform, to investigate the voluntary audit committee, auditor selection and audit quality; this paper expands on Abbott and Parker’s (2000) study of audit committee characteristics and auditor selection at the audit firm level by examining this relationship at the individual audit partner level; this paper responds to the call by Church et al. (2008) and DeFond and Francis (2005) who propose more studies on audit quality at the individual engagement partner level.

This chapter examines corporate governance–related financial reporting issues in the context of globalization. Over the past few decades, the process of globalization has substantially altered the fields of corporate governance and accounting. More specifically, Anglo-American models of corporate governance and financial reporting have received increasing momentum in emerging economies, including China. However, a review of relevant studies suggests that there is limited research examining the implementation of Anglo-American concepts in various countries regardless of their growing acceptance. This monograph extends the existing literature by comprehensively investigating the adoption of internationally acceptable principles and standards in China, the largest transitional economy that has different institutional context from Anglo-American countries. In addition, the review has a number of implications for developing the theoretical framework, and determining the research methodology for the monograph.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of corporate governance (focused on some key mechanisms as board size, board independence, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and chief executive officer duality) on financial analysts’ behavior in US. Results from panel data analysis for 294 US listed firms observed from 2007 to 2014 show that several attributes of the board of directors and audit committee have no effects on the number of analysts who are following the firm and the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Findings also suggest that firms with independent and large boards and blockholders ownership benefit of more analyst following. In addition, it is proven that analysts’ earnings forecasts are optimistic and more accurate for companies where blockholder ownership, either by managers or external entities have larger quoted spreads but of lower quality for the ones which have greater independent board members and institutional investor’s holding.

In an effort to restore investor confidence in the wake of recent financial reporting scandals, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 mandates that audit committees be fully independent and have at least one financial expert. The SEC adopted rules implementing these Sarbanes‐Oxley provisions. This paper contributes to the literature on the association between audit committee characteristics recommended by SOX and the likelihood of fraud in two ways. First, we focus on audit committee composition and the extent of the underlying nature of the firm (e.g., firm size, growth) and the contracting environment (e.g., managerial ownership, leverage) of the firm on the likelihood of fraud. In particular, we find that the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting is negatively related to audit committee independence, number of audit committee meetings and managerial ownership and positively related to firm size and firm growth opportunities. Second, we separately examine firms with totally independent audit committees and fraudulent financial reporting. This sample is interesting because these are firms that had good corporate governance and yet still had fraudulent financial reporting. By separately examining firms with totally independent audit committees, we find that the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting given a totally independent audit committee is inversely related to the level of managerial ownership and the number of audit committee meetings.

This chapter aims to enhance understanding of the main drivers of internal auditors' moral courage to speak up about sensitive information and their cause-and-effect relationships. We use cognitive mapping method to analyze 20 chief audit executives' cognitive maps in Tunisia. A collective map was grounded through assembling the full individual maps. Using the Decision Explorer software for our analysis, we find that the state hope, whistle-blowing policy, self-efficacy, perceived supervisor support and independence of internal audit function are the main drivers for internal auditors' moral courage. Our findings are also supplemented by semi-structured interviews. Our chapter offers a novel methodological contribution to auditing literature as well as new empirical evidence (contribution to knowledge) on the drivers of internal auditors' moral courage.